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Get Your Hands Off My Money! Understanding Identity Theft and Best Practices

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Your Presenters Today

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Agenda

- How Identity Theft Can Occur
- Understanding the Liability
- Current Court Cases in the News
- Real-Life Case Studies
- Best Practices to Help Avoid Becoming a Victim
- Final Thoughts



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Understanding the Landscape

- 67% of CISOs feel their business is likely to have a data breach or suffer a cyber attack in 2018 (Ponemon, 2018)
- Ransomware attacks are growing at a rate in excess of 350% per year (largest increase is in healthcare) (Cisco, 2017)
- In 2017 the number of malware variants identified increased 88% (Symantec, 2017)
- Global cost of cybercrime exceeded \$600B in 2017 (McAfee, 2018)
- 978MM people or companies in 20 countries were victimized in 2017 (2.7MM per day) (Norton – 2018)
- Avg. cost of a U.S. data breach
 - \$3.62MM per breach (Ponemon, 2017)
 - \$141 per record (\$245 in Financial Services)
- 78% of all crimes involve malware, or other web-based attacks (Verizon Data Breach Report, 2018)



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Everyone's 401(k) Account Is at Risk

- Retirement plan accounts have become attractive targets to thieves/hackers
 - Large account balances growing over time
 - Often larger than all other bank and investment accounts owned by individuals
 - Per Fidelity Investments, the average 401(k) account balance is > \$104,000
 - Participants are often encouraged to not look at their accounts frequently to mitigate day trading or emotional investing
 - Means that accounts are often unmonitored



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Everyone's 401(k) Account Is at Risk

- Institutions
 - Smaller institutions may have poor controls/training
 - Some large recordkeepers may have no direct personal relationship with participants
 - which may make fraud easier to perpetrate




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How Identity Theft Can Occur

- Social Engineering is the most common form of 401(k) account fraud
- Social Engineering is psychological manipulation designed to cause people to disclose personal and confidential information
 - Sob story/pull at your heart-strings
 - Call you by name/pretend familiarity
 - A compelling explanation
 - “Sweet talking”
- Usually just one step in a complex scheme



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Social Engineering Prevention

- Humans are the weak link in this process
- Have stringent controls regarding the requirements for account access and the disclosure of sensitive information
 - Have a written policy in place, and ENFORCE it
- Educate all employees on the types of attacks being employed
- Don't confuse excellent customer service with handing criminals the keys to the kingdom



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Berman v. Estee Lauder

- \$12,000 withdrawn 9/29/16
- \$37,000 withdrawn 10/7/16
- \$50,000 withdrawn 10/18/16
- Berman gets first notice on 10/10/16 and immediately contacts Hewitt Customer Svc.
- Between 10/24/16 – 1/2/17, Berman makes 23 calls to customer service and gets nowhere



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Berman v. Estee Lauder (cont.)

- 10/25/16 Berman reports theft to SFPD and FBI
 - She's also smart enough to place a fraud alert with Equifax
- 11/7/16 – Custodian requests Berman completes an Affidavit of Forgery, then crickets.....
- Finally, Berman has enough and files her lawsuit on 10/9/19
- May 2020 – undisclosed settlement has been reached



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Barnett v. Abbott Labs

- 12/29/18 – Request for password reset from unknown phone number.
 - Thief had DOB and last 4 of SSN.
 - Had code sent to email, but Barnett never received. Thief used info to change direct deposit information.
- 12/31/18 – Service Rep disclosed home address to thief.
- 1/01/19 – RK mails confirmation notification despite Barnett's election to receive email notices.
- 1/08/19 – Second request for password change. Code emailed again. \$245,000 request approved.



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Bartnett v. Abbott Labs (cont.)

- 1/09/19 – Recordkeeper mails confirmation again, not email, and discloses address to thief.
- 1/14/19 – \$245,000 transferred to SunTrust account. Bartnett receives notification of withdrawal request.
- 1/15/19 – Barnett immediately notifies Abbott and Police.
- Recovered \$59,500 from SunTrust and \$48,900 in taxes withheld from the withdrawal.
- 12/2019 – Barnett rejects Abbott's settlement offer of 10%.
- 04/03/20 – Barnett files lawsuit. (Is anyone surprised?)



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Leventhal v. MandMarblestone

- Dec. 2015 – A participant (and Plan trustee) requests \$15,000 distribution via email.
- A fraudster gains access to Leventhal's system.
 - TPA claims that an employee was allowed to work remotely and use her personal email address for official duties, which gave the fraudster access to Leventhal's system.
- Fraudster, posing as an office administrator of Leventhal, submits falsified distribution requests via email totaling over \$400,000.
 - The communications appeared to originate from Leventhal's office email.
 - Money was sent to an account not previously associated with the participant/trustee.
- Who is the fiduciary? Leventhal is named fiduciary in the Plan. Both TPA and the Custodian deny being fiduciaries.



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Leventhal (cont.)


- Leventhal claims TPA and Custodian are (1) fiduciaries, and (2) jointly and severally liable for any breach.
 - ERISA 405(a) – Fiduciaries may be liable for the breaches of co-fiduciaries.
 - Judge preliminarily determines that breaching co-fiduciaries are jointly and severally liable.
- TPA seeks contribution and indemnity from Leventhal via counterclaim (i.e., if Leventhal also breached its duties, it should be proportionately liable for any losses).
 - Judge allows claim to go forward, based on general trust law, as there is no contrary precedent in the 3d Cir. and it is not explicitly prohibited by ERISA.
- Judge does not decide whether TPA and Custodian are fiduciaries.
 - Possible fiduciary status was sufficiently plead for claim to go forward. If Custodian is a fiduciary, its agreement disclaiming liability violates ERISA.



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Real Life Case Studies



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Case Study #1

- TPA's employee opens a phishing email.
- TPA immediately notifies IT Company that employee clicked the email. IT does not detect any threats.
- The following week TPA is notified that the employee's email is sending out phishing emails.
- IT immediately disables account and confirms that an outside party accessed the account.
 - New security protocols put in place
- TPA sends out notification of the breach to its current clients.



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Case Study #1 (cont.)

- TPA maintains insurance that covers the personal data breach and files a claim.
- IT completes a forensic review of the email box for personal data. The review returns thousands of emails that contain personal data.
 - User never cleaned out email box, so emails go back years
- TPA must review the 2,000 emails and prepare a list of individuals affected by the breach.
- Insurance requires TPA to use approved provider for credit monitoring and notification.
 - Cost of mailing is about \$1 per head. Then, add in cost of monitoring service at \$25-\$30 per head. Additional costs if anyone is violated.



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Case Study #1 (cont.)

- TPA does not have addresses for all of the affected individuals.
 - TPA provides services to other TPAs, so many affected clients aren't even theirs.
- Notification of the breach, including free credit monitoring, is sent to the affected individuals in eight states.
- Each state has different data breach laws.
 - The approved provider does not provide state notification support, so it's now the client's responsibility to figure this out.
- Calls start coming in to TPA during the first few weeks, then die down.
 - Less than 10% of the notified participants request the monitoring.



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Case Study #2

- Plan Sponsor submits a legitimate request for distribution to the TPA.
- TPA's employee opens a phishing email.
- Fraudster gains access to the employee's email account.
- Fraudster creates false email addresses that appear to be genuine and uses them to communicate with both TPA and Plan Sponsor.
 - Changes distribution instructions from check to wire.
 - Obtains bank account information for the participant from Plan Sponsor.
- TPA wires distribution to the bank account provided by the fraudster.
- Money never arrives at participant's account.
- Plan Sponsor reaches out to TPA via a different contact.



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Cast Study #2 (cont.)

- TPA contacts its IT professional, who audits system and determines that no breach occurred.
 - Plan Sponsor believes TPA is liable and demands reimbursement.
 - TPA denies reimbursement based on IT professional's assertion.
- TPA maintains cybersecurity insurance for such breaches. Because a demand was made, TPA still files a claim.
- Insurer advises TPA to hire an outside IT firm to perform an independent audit. (Great advice!)
- Independent audit identifies:
 - The original phishing email used to access the TPA employee's account.
 - A forwarding rule implanted by the fraudster gave him access to emails for several weeks. Approximately 450 emails were forwarded to the fraudster under the rule.



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Case Study #2 (cont.)

- TPA agrees to settlement with the Plan Sponsor and reimburses the money to the participant (ultimately, funds were covered by insurance).
- TPA, with assistance of the outside IT firm, implements new security protocols.
 - Passwords changed and fraudster's access cut off.
 - Email forwarding rule disabled.
 - System updates and Multi-Factor Authentication enabled.



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Case Study #2 (cont.)

- TPA audits emails that had been forwarded for personal information.
 - Personal information was potentially exposed for five individuals.
 - Data includes names, DOB, address, SSN.
- TPA must notify all affected individuals and state agencies, as applicable.
 - Five different state laws at issue. We advised TPA on reporting requirements.
 - Insurer provided credit monitoring services to the affected individuals.



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Case Study #3

- “Participant” calls TPA asking how he can get an in-service distribution.
- TPA sends “Participant” back to Plan Sponsor for a distribution form.
- Distribution form arrives at TPA’s office requesting in-service withdrawal of \$450,000.
 - Signed by HR Director as Plan Administrator.
 - Notarized signature of spouse.
- “Participant” calls TPA’s office after form received to confirm it is being processed.
- TPA processes form and, three days later, the actual Participant calls to ask where his money went.



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Case Study #3 (cont.)

- What did the TPA do right?
- What did the TPA do wrong?
- What could the TPA have done differently?
- What other questions do you have?



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Case Study #3 (cont.)

- TPA takes the extra steps and calls the RK/Custodian requesting to put a stop on the transfer.
- TPA calls the receiving bank trying to get the funds returned.
- “Participant” calls back trying to find out why money isn’t available for immediate withdrawal.
- Only the federal and state withholding amounts remain to be returned to the Participant’s account.
- FBI is contacted and plants an agent in the TPA office, taps phones, etc., in case “Participant” calls back.



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Understanding the Liability

- When PII is stolen, the responsibility lies with both the service provider that disclosed the information and the plan fiduciaries.
 - Were the existing data protection procedures reasonable?
 - Were they applied and enforced?
 - Was the risk reasonably considered?
 - Was there an opportunity to prevent the risk or recover the data?
 - Did the responsible fiduciary satisfy their duties in hiring and monitoring the service provider?
 - In other words, did they even ask about cybersecurity?



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Liability Issues

- When plan assets are stolen, victimized participants will look to the plan administrator, recordkeeper, and/or plan sponsor to make them whole
- But is the participant entitled to restitution? Maybe...
- Not much case law on the issue
 - Two primary cases to illustrate the risks
 - And the bottom line - you better have a reasonable process in place...



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Reasonable Procedures

- What are “reasonable procedures” to safeguard plan assets?
 - TPAs, recordkeepers, custodians, plan sponsors, etc., should be asking:
 - Does each entity have a documented cyber- and data-security policy in place?
 - How often are the procedures reviewed, tested, and revised?
 - Are employees trained on the risks?
 - How is PII transmitted and how is it stored?
 - What procedures are in place to protect PII from improper disclosure?
 - What is the policy on breach notification?
 - What password policies exist for access to sensitive data or plan or participant accounts?
 - Is Multi-Factor Authentication available?



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Best Practices

- Client Communications
 - Requiring use of a secure portal
 - Email warning footer regarding failure to use secure portal
 - Article/newsletter to clients regarding protection of data
 - Even just forwarding articles written by others can be helpful



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Best Practices (cont.)

- Client Procedures
 - How do they communicate payroll information?
 - How many people have access to confidential client information?
 - Do they have internal procedures to double-check requests?
 - Basic due diligence standard recommendations
 - Creation of verification checklist
 - Have them confirm ERISA bond covers breach



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Best Practices (cont.)

- TPA Practices
 - Best Practice Considerations:
 - Implementation of internal basic checklist for reviewing withdrawal/loan applications
 - Use of a threshold dollar amount for special attention
 - Possible temporary freeze for withdrawals/loans on accounts after address changes
 - How does this play into SOX requirements?
 - Implementation of secondary PIN
 - Service agreement provisions to outline procedures and limit liability for actions outside procedures by participant or plan sponsor



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Participant Best Practices

- Change to all electronic statements and billing from paper copies
- Remove identifying information from social media
- Change passwords to high security/random
 - Use services like Dashline, Norton, etc.
- Freeze credit
- Utilize alerts on credit cards, bank accounts, etc.



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Questions?



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